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THE SPACE BETWEEN GRAND OPTIMISM AND GRIM
DETERMINATION: FINhINc A PATHWAY FORWARD IN
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW
Cinnamon P. Carlarne
I. Introduction
We find ourselves at a point in time when maintaining hope in our collective
efforts to address climate change is more important and, yet, more challenging
than ever. Reason to feel pessimistic about both the effects of climate change and
the failures of our legal and political efforts to address climate change abound. A
recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (PCC) em-
phasizes that the we are already experiencing impacts to natural and human sys-
tems, that land and ocean ecosystems and the services they provide have and will
continue to change, and that "pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no
or limited overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy,
land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial
systems".' Yet, despite more than 25 years of debate and effort, we continue to
lack governance structures of sufficient scale and intensity to address the grow-
ing climate crises. Progress has been made and continues to be made, but the
pace and depth of that progress is inadequate to limit dangerous anthropogenic
climate change. The task of responding to climate change, thus, grows more
daunting by the day.
In his prescient article from 2003, Building Bridges over Troubled Waters:
Eco-Pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect, Professor Dan Farber noted
that in the face of such daunting environmental challenges "excessive pessimism
can be paralyzing, but blithe optimism can be fatal." 2 Taking on the particular
challenge of climate change, as understood in 2003, Farber contended that al-
though climate change "presents one of the most intractable commons
problems.. .even here there is hope, despite the U.S. government's abandonment
of international negotiations on the subject."' 3 Hope, as Farber envisioned it then,
rested largely on the advent of a technological revolution and the development of
effective alternative energy technologies that would enable significant emissions
reductions. Hope also, inevitably, included the eventual reversal of political
course by the US government. Between 2003 and 2018, of course, much has
happened. Our understanding of climate science has deepened, with the result of
I IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C, D1 (Oct. 6, 2018), https://report.ipcc.ch/srl5/pdf/
srl5_spm-final.pdf.
2 Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges Over Troubled Waters: Eco-Pragmatism and the Environmen-
tal Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REv. 851, 852 (2003) (the report further notes that "these systems transitions
are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed, and imply deep emissions
reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant upscaling of investments
in those options").
3 Farber, supra note 2, at 867.
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intensifying concerns about the pressing nature of the challenge. The United
States has shifted from a laggard to a leader to an opposition force in interna-
tional climate change negotiations as executive power shifted from Presidents
Bush, to Obama, to Trump. Energy technologies have evolved tremendously and
to positive end, but the needed energy revolution is still in progress and has yet to
offer the necessary pathway to widespread change.
In framing environmental challenges as involving the Herculean task of find-
ing a balance between understandable pessimism and fleeting optimism, Farber
suggested that the "best reason not to despair is simply that on occasion we have
somehow managed to overcome . . . barriers" to successfully address environ-
mental challenges.4 Farber was focused on a range of environmental challenges,
of which climate change was just one. His frame, however, proved prophetic to
the complex dynamics of optimism and pessimism that have characterized cli-
mate law and policy and that have, over time, made it increasingly difficult to
maneuver and push forward with hope within an increasingly urgent and time-
constrained space.
That space was given additional contour and urgency six years after Farber
framed the governance challenge when, in their seminal article, Planetary
Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity, Johan Rockstrim
et al. proposed the "novel concept, planetary boundaries, for estimating a safe
operating space for humanity with respect to the functioning of the Earth Sys-
tem."'5 Using the concept of planetary boundaries, Rockstrom et al. identified
nine planetary boundaries 6 that humans need to remain within to ensure that hu-
manity can live and persist sustainably. In delineating these nine planetary
boundaries, two were defined as core boundaries, the crossing of which "has the
potential on its own to drive the Earth System into a new state should they be
substantially and persistently transgressed."'7 One of these two core boundaries is
the climate system. In determining the planetary boundary for climate change,
the authors noted both the general challenges inherent in establishing planetary
4 Id. at 883.
5 Johan Rockstrom et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity,
14(2) ECOLOGY & Soc'v 32, 33 (2009) (In key part, Rockstr6m et al. identify "key Earth System
processes and attempt to quantify for each process the boundary level that should not be transgressed if
we are to avoid unacceptable global environmental change." They define unacceptable change "in rela-
tion to the risks humanity faces in the transition of the planet from the Holocene to the Anthropocene.").
6 Id. at 32 (These seven are: climate change (CO2 concentration in the atmosphere <350 ppm and/or
a maximum change of +1 W m -2 in radiative forcing); ocean acidification (mean surface seawater satura-
tion state with respect to aragonite = 80% of pre-industrial levels); stratospheric ozone (<5% reduction in
03 concentration from pre-industrial level of 290 Dobson Units); biogeochemical nitrogen (N) cycle(limit industrial and agricultural fixation of N2 to 35 Tg N yr) and phosphorus (P) cycle (annual P inflow
to oceans not to exceed 10 times the natural background weathering of P); global freshwater use (<4000
km 3 yr - of consumptive use of runoff resources); land system change (<15% of the ice-free land surface
under cropland); and the rate at which biological diversity is lost (annual rate of <10 extinctions per
million species). The two additional planetary boundaries for which we have not yet been able to deter-
mine a boundary level are chemical pollution and atmospheric aerosol loading).
7 Will Steffen et al., Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet,
SCIENCF VOL. 347, ISS. 6223 at 736. (Feb. 13, 2015), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/347/6223/
1259855/tab-pdf (noting that climate change is one of two "core boundaries" - the other being biosphere
integrity).
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boundaries and the fact that the "climate-change boundary is currently under vig-
orous discussion" as part of the UNFCCC negotiations leading up to what would
ultimately become the Paris Agreement. Acknowledging that there was a grow-
ing convergence toward a "2°C guardrail" approach, that is, containing the rise in
global mean temperature to no more than 2°C above the preindustrial level,
Rockstrdm et al. ultimately proposed a complementary planetary boundary that
suggested that carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere needed to be con-
tained to 350 ppm. 8 Unfortunately, by the time this planetary boundary concept
was proposed and delineated for climate change, the suggested climate planetary
boundary had already been transgressed. 9 Despite this transgression, the plane-
tary boundary offered a more precisely delineated physical concept around which
to construct and judge governance efforts.
Six years following the publication of Planetary Boundaries, the parties to the
UNFCCC adopted the Paris Agreement in an attempt to chart a pathway forward
towards overcoming the effective paralysis that kept the international community
hurtling beyond the edges of the boundary for the climate system. However, by
the time the Paris Agreement was adopted, not only had the planetary boundary
for climate change already been crossed, but average global concentrations of
carbon dioxide were lingering around the 400 ppm mark and continuing to
climb. 10
International climate law, thus, now operates in what could easily be imagined
as a paralyzing place. As information continues to amass about the existential
challenge that climate change poses for present and future generation and the gap
between what we need to do, and what we are committed to doing to address
climate change grows, so too does climate related anxiety. Facing this daunting
challenge, law and policymakers must find ways navigate and keep pushing for-
ward even as cause for optimism proves harder to find.
Within this frame, this short essay seeks to accomplish three things. First, it
seeks to convince the reader to view climate change as one of the greatest legal
and political challenges of our time by very succinctly emphasizing some of the
anticipated risks and impacts of climate change and the ways in which these
impacts shape the way we think about and respond to climate change. Second, it
examines the overarching goals of international climate change law and the ex-
tent to which the Paris Agreement advances those goals. Third, it considers the
most important roadblocks to our collective efforts to address climate change,
focusing on the collective action nature of climate change and the perpetuation of
an idealized vision of a cooperative international community. The essay con-
cludes by arguing that law is an essential tool in our fight against climate change,
but that using law effectively in this context means breaking free of a vision of
8 Rockstrdm et al., supra note 5, at P (The climate boundary was set based on two factors C02
concentrations and radiative forcing, with suggested boundary values of "350 ppm C02 and 1 W m-2").
9 Id. (In addition, Rockstrdm et al. suggested that we had already transgressed three planetary
boundaries: for climate change, rate of biodiversity loss, and changes to the global nitrogen cycle).
10 See Id. (reiterating that the planetary boundary for climate change dictated that carbon dioxide
levels should not cross 350 ppm in the atmosphere, which is consistent with the secondary goal of the
Paris Agreement to stabilize the global temperature at 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels).
Loyola University Chicago International Law ReviewVolume 16, Issue I
International Climate Change Law
law as a top down sweeping tool capable of offering grand solutions. Instead, it
suggests that we must think of law as an enabling instrument that can help us
make the multitude of changes we need to make to reshape ourselves so as to
allow present and future generations to live safely and sustainably.
Part I: The Basic Parameters of the Problem
Conversations about the processes of, and responses to anthropogenic climate
change have come to dominate the work of scientists, environmentalists, and
policymakers, alike. The focus on anthropogenic climate change, however, re-
mains a relatively recent phenomenon. It bears reminding that this is a young
field still struggling to find the optimal mix of tools to address one of the most
massive and complex challenges of our time. In fact, it is only over the last thirty
years that climate change has been identified as the most pressing environmental
challenge of our time, and it is only within the past 25 years that the contours of
the now rapidly developing body of climate change law have begun to emerge
and take shape. Thus, while we now take for granted the need for collective
conversations focused on taking stock of the state of climate change science and
climate change law, this was not always the case. Until quite recently, climate
change was framed as one of a handful of critical international environmental
challenges - as just another complex global environmental problem."
However, as the science and governance responses have evolved and as legal
experimentation has progressed, even over this short period of time, it has be-
come increasingly clear that climate change is not just another environmental
problem. In fact, it has become apparent that climate change is much more than
an environmental challenge. It is and must be treated as much more; it is a prob-
lem of human health, human rights, security, and fundamental human and plane-
tary well-being. Ultimately, it is a problem that exposes layers of human
vulnerabilities. It is more than international; more than environmental; more than
legal. It is, as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has warned, "a direct exis-
tential threat" to humankind. 12
Growing recognition of the existential nature of climatic change has given rise
to a rapid period of law and policymaking at virtually every level of governance.
In fact, "at all levels, from cities through the international sphere, laws, regula-
tions and court decisions relating to climate change have proliferated. They cover
topics ranging from international finance mechanisms to countries impacted by
climate change to regulations of the electrical grid to carbon trading systems to
aviation emissions" 13 to geoengineering, to automobile and shipping emissions,
11 For a more robust discussion of the framing of climate change, see Cinnamon Carlame, Delinking
International Environmental Law & Climate Change, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 1 (2014), https:/
/repository. law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi ?article= 1 029&context=MJeal.
12 United Nations Secretary-General, Secretary-General's Remarks on Climate Change [as deliv-
ered], (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-09-10/secretary-generals-re
marks-climate-change-delivered.
13 See Daniel A. Farber & Cinnamon P. Carlarne, CLIMA'E CHANGE LAW I (St. Paul, MN: Founda-
tion Press 2018).
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and much more. The emerging body of laws and policies is extensive but
fragmented.
One thing that all of these developments have in common is a shared goal of
limiting the negative effects of climate change. The evolving systems of law also
increasingly reflect the ways in which climate change exposes the extent to
which humanity is inescapably entangled in a network of mutuality, and the de-
gree to which our individual actions and the individual harms we suffer affect
one another both directly and indirectly. 14 And, while debates persist about par-
ticular patterns of change and the most apt legal and political responses, "scien-
tific confidence has grown over the past few decades about the reality of
anthropogenic climate change, the role of greenhouse gases in forcing climatic
change, and the present and future harmful impacts. It is this scientific knowl-
edge that provides the foundation of legal and policy efforts at the domestic and
international level." 15
Scientific knowledge about the processes of atmospheric climate change also
reveals the challenge at the heart of the problem. Regardless of where greenhouse
gases are emitted, they enter the atmosphere and are effectively mixed. As a
result, while the vast majority of global greenhouse gas emissions may emanate
from a small handful of the most powerful states, including the United States,
China, and the European Union, these emissions intermingle to force patterns of
global climate change that impact the entire planet. Because no state can either
unilaterally limit another state's emissions, or protect itself from the combined
impacts of climate change, responding to climate change requires international
cooperation. In key part, it requires mobilizing the participation of the most pow-
erful states, that is, the largest global economic and political actors who, by and
large, are also the most significant greenhouse gas emitters. The future well-
being of the vast majority of states, thus, depend on the participation and actions
of a small handful of states, making climate change the ultimate commons
problem.
Before exploring the ways in which the legal regime has evolved in response
to these fundamental governance challenges, it is necessary to concisely frame
the challenges climate change poses for humanity and, thus, what is at stake with
respect to our efforts to develop effective systems of climate change law.
Although there are areas of uncertainty, the basic facts about anthropogenic
climate change, by now, are firmly established. The Earth's climate is changing.
The world is warming. Changes in the climate system are driven by anthropo-
genic - that is, by human - factors. The central debate about anthropogenic forc-
ing of the climate system is settled. 16 We know it is happening. We know it is,
14 For a more extensive discussion of the justice, equity, and fairness dimensions of climate change,
see Cinnamon P. Carlarne & JD Colavecchio, Balancing Equity and Effectiveness: The Paris Agreement
and the Future of International Climate Change Law, 27 NYU J. ENVTL. L. 107, 110 (2019), https:/
www.nyuelj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CarlarneBalancing-Equity-and-Effectiveness.pdf.
15 Farber & Carlame, supra note 13, at 2.
16 See, e.g., NASA: Global Climate Change, Scientific Consensus: Earth's Climate is Warming,
https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/; John Cook et al., Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of
Consensus Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming, 11 ENVTL. RFSEARCH LE-M-ERS 4, 4 (2016).
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and will continue to wreck great harm on human and natural systems. The ques-
tion is not if it is happening, but rather, what does humanity want to do about it.17
So, what do these changes look like? As is now well documented, recent years
rank at the top of the list of the warmest global temperatures. According to the
fifth assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
"[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of
the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmos-
phere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished,
and sea level has risen."1 8 In addition, "each of the last three decades has been
successively warmer at the Earth's surface than any preceding decade since
1850," and in the Northern Hemisphere, "1983-2012 was likely the warmest 30-
year period of the last 1400 years." 19 In fact, the last 4 years have been the
warmest years on recent record. Over the past decade, we have also experienced
an improbable number of forest fires, droughts, heat waves, floods and record-
breaking storms. As the IPCC details in its 2018 Special Report on Global
Warming of 1.5°C, "human activities are estimated to have caused approximately
I.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels", and "[g]lobal warming is
likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the
current rate. o20
Given current patterns of greenhouse gas emissions, absent concerted change,
we are now on track to reach average global warming of 2°C by the end of the
century; this level of warming would leave the earth warmer than it has been in
millions of years and expose the planet to far worse impacts even than previously
expected. In key part, as the IPCC report highlights, "climate-related risks to
health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic
growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase fur-
ther with 2°C.''21
As Priyardarshi Shukla, the co-author of the Special Report summarizes, this
most recent assessment highlights the harmful effects of climate change at pre-
sent levels of warming and at 1.5°C, but demonstrates that "[Il]imiting global
warming to 1.5°C compared with 2°C would reduce challenging impacts on eco-
17 See, e.g., IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, in IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACrS, ADAPTA-
TION, AND VULNERABn rrY (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar5-wgll-
spm-en.pdf; IPCC, Technical Summary, in IPCC CLIAT: CHANGE 2014, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/O2/WGIIAR5-TSFINAL.pdf.
18 IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: 2014 Synthesis Report: Summary for Policy-
makers 1 (2014).
19 T.F. Stocker et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE
BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTFRGOVFRN-
MENTAL PANEL ON CLMATF CHANGE, PCC (2013), http://www.climatechange20l3.org/images/report/
WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.
20 IPCC, Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5'C Approved
by Governments 1, 4 (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/news and-events/pr_181008-P48-spm.shtml.
21 Id. at 11, 24. The report emphasizes that the "avoided climate change impacts on sustainable
development, eradication of poverty and reducing inequalities would be greater if global warming were
limited to 1.50 C rather than 2°C, if mitigation and adaptation synergies are maximized while trade-offs
are minimized."
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systems, human health, and well-being",22 including minimizing impacts such as
"stronger storms, more erratic weather, dangerous heat waves, rising seas, and
large scale disruption to infrastructure and migration patterns. '23 Renowned cli-
matologist, Michael Mann, states it more clearly, explaining that: "The further
we go the more explosions we are likely to set off: 1.5C is safer than 2C, 2C is
safer than 2.5C, 2.5C is safer than 3C, and so on."124 Together, Shukla and
Mann's comments highlight the importance of governance efforts designed to
limit greenhouse gas emissions and, thus, keep warming below 2°C.
These recent reports refine our understanding of how patterns of climate
change could play out in the future, but they also reveal the ways in which cli-
mate change is already impacting life on Earth. And, of course, we - all of us -
are already beginning to experience the effects of climate change. In recent years,
China and Europe experienced record summer heats, 25 devastating floods swept
through India and Japan,26 Arctic sea ice continued to retreat at an alarming
pace,27 toxic algal blooms exploded along the Florida coast,28 and wide swaths of
forests on the US and Canadian West Coast burned. 29 In other words, climate
change is already well under way.
22 Stephen Leahy, Climate Change Impacts Worse than Expected, Global Report Warns, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC, (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/10/ipcc-report-cli-
mate-change-impacts-forests-emissions/; see also, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 20, at 1 (quot-
ing Hans-Otto Pdrtner, Co-Chair of IPCC Working Group 11: "Every extra bit of warming matters,
especially since warming of 1.5'C or higher increases the risk associated with long-lasting or irreversible
changes, such as the loss of some ecosystems").
23 Leahy, supra note 22.
24 See Leahy, supra note 22; World Bank, Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Im-
pacts, and the Case for Resilience (2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/publication/
turn-down-the-heat-climate-extremes-regional-impacts-resilience (Bolstering the IPCC report, the World
Bank similarly considers the warmer, 2 degrees scenario to be devastating, with a dire list of conse-
quences: "the inundation of coastal cities; increasing risks for food production ... leading to higher
malnutrition rates; .. .dry regions becoming drier, wet regions wetter; unprecedented heat waves in
many regions... [of the world]; substantially exacerbated water scarcity in many regions; increased fre-
quency of high-intensity tropical cyclones; and irreversible loss of biodiversity, including [our beautiful
and fundamentally important] coral reef systems.").
25 See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, Scorching Summer in Europe Signals Long-Term Climate Changes NY-
TIMEs (Aug. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/04/world/europe/europe-heat-wave.html; Jason
Samenow, All-Time Heat Records Have Been Set All Over the World this Week, THE INDEPENDENT (July
5, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/heatwave-temperature-records-broken-europe-
north-america-eurasia-middle-east-latest-a8432226.html.
26 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, More Than 1,000 Died in South Asia Floods This Summer, NY TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/20l7/08/29/world/asia/floods-south-asia-india-bangladesh-
nepal-houston.html; Jessie Yeung et al., Japan Floods: At Least 122 Dead after Heavy Rain and Land-
slides, CNN (July 10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/asialjapan-floods-intl/index.html.
27 National Snow & Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea Ice Extent Arrives at its Minimum (Sept. 27, 2018),
http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2018/0 9 /.
28 See, e.g., Angela Fritz, How Climate Change is Making 'red tide' Algal Blooms Even Worse, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/
201 8/08/14/how-climate-change-is-making-red-tide-algal-blooms-even-worse/
?noredirect=on&utmterm=.c9bfdcd68d7l; Brigit Katz, A Toxic Algal Bloom Is Spreading in Florida's
Waterways, SMITHSONIANMAG.COM (July 10, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/toxic-
algal-bloom-spreading-floridas-waterways-i 80969586/.
29 See, e.g., Kurtis Alexander, Scientists See Fingerprints of Climate Change All Over California's
Wildfires, SF CHRONICLE (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/science/article/Scientists-see-fin-
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This description is, of course, just a fragment of the picture. The arc of climate
change is long, the variables are complex, and our models reach only so far and
offer only so much clarity. We find ourselves at a moment in time, however,
when our collective understanding of anthropogenic climate change is sharp
enough to reveal both our inescapable interconnectedness and the reality that, if
we hope to achieve meaningful progress towards mitigating climate change and
meaningful progress towards creating a more just world - goals that are not nec-
essarily either complementary or collectively shared, our time frame for doing so
grows short.
This leads us to our second theme, which is to investigate the overarching
goals of international climate change law, and to consider whether the Paris
Agreement moves us forward towards meeting those goals and, ultimately, to-
wards keeping humanity within a safe operating space.
Part H: The State and Purpose of International Climate Change Law
We know that humans are influencing the climate system. We know that the
anticipated impact of this human forcing is and will lead to widespread harm. We
also know that in order to limit climate change and to minimize the harmful
effects of climate change worldwide, we must reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
We being all of the state parties to the UNFCCC, but especially the big polluting
states. Therein lies the heart of the problem. The causes of climate change are
driven by a small handful of very powerful states. The effects of climate change,
however, are felt by all of humankind, but especially - most severely and most
urgently - in low-income countries and, especially, in those places where people
are already experiencing high levels of vulnerability. In other words, climate
change is the greatest collective-action problem of our time,30 but it also gives
rise to some of the greatest distributional justice and equity challenges of our
time. We - humanity - are all deeply and fully in this together, but only some
key state actors have the capacity to limit the causes and consequences of climate
change, and even fewer have the will.
As Professor Dan Farber and I have explained elsewhere:
Obtaining international cooperation on collective action challenges
such as this is never easy, and in this case of climate change it is further
hindered by uncertainties about the timing and extent of harm, our general
lack of experience with problems having multi-century footprints, uncer-
tainty about how to decarbonize our energy systems while continuing to
allow economic development, and the perception that short-term, individ-
ual state economic interests - particularly the interests of the big polluter
gerprints-of-climate-change-all-13128585.php; John Kurucz, Summer Wild Fires and Smoke-Clogged
Skies the New Normal in B.C., VANCOUVER COURIER (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.vancourier.com/
news/summer-wild-fires-and-smoke-clogged-skies-the-new-normal-in-b-c_ 1.23401953.
30 See, e.g., Farber & Carlarne, supra note 13, at 10-11.
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states, the great power states - are often in conflict with the collective
interest of combating climate change on behalf of humankind.
31
It is, by now, well understood that the stakes of, and barriers to addressing
climate change are irrefutably high. So, where are we with our evolving system
of climate law, and where do we go from here?
In order to assess the state of international climate change law, we must first
ask whether there is a common goal that underpins efforts in this area and the
degree to which this goal rests on shared assumptions that have remained true
over time. At a very basic level, Article 2 of the UNFCCC defines the ultimate
goal of international climate change law as the: "stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system." 32 The 2015 Paris Agreement reit-
erates this goal, committing parties to "holding the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to
limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels." 33 Both
agreements situate efforts to address climate change within a context that simul-
taneously seeks to advance equity, sustainable development, and poverty eradica-
tion. Consequently, it might be argued that the twin goals of international climate
change law are to mitigate climate change - holding it, at a minimum, to less
than 2°C - and to do so in a way that advances equity and reduces risks to human
populations.
Accepting that limiting anthropogenic climate change to keep humanity with a
safe planetary operating space, and doing so in a way that also allows us to move
towards a more just world are the goals that sit at the heart of international cli-
mate change law, the pressing question is whether the 2015 Paris Agreement
advances efforts to achieve these goals.
Upon adoption, the Paris Agreement was widely heralded as a positive step
forward in efforts to structure an effective international climate change regime.
The Paris Agreement represented the culmination of efforts, begun in Copenha-
gen in 2009, to create a more flexible and bottom-up model for addressing cli-
mate change. As Bodansky describes it, the end result is a bit of "a Goldilocks
solution that is neither too strong (and hence unacceptable to key states) nor too
weak (and hence ineffective). '34
At its core, the Agreement commits the Parties to limiting warming to 2°C
above pre-industrial levels while pursuing efforts to limit the temperature in-
crease to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,35 while also directing the Parties "to
31 Id. at 3.
32 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, S. Treaty Doc
No. 102-38, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC].
33 Paris Agreement, Preamble, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (entered into
force Nov. 4, 2016).
34 Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. 288,
289 (2016).
35 Paris Agreement, supra note 33.
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reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible... and to
undertake rapid reductions thereafter. . . on the basis of equity, and in the context
of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty." 36 In addition, Par-
ties to the agreement commit to increasing pathways towards adaptation, and to
improving climate finance all within a framework focused on reflecting "equity
and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities". 3 7 In key part, the Paris Agreement upends the Kyoto Protocol's
approach to addressing climate change that was based on establishing one shared
international emissions-reduction goal and, instead, creates a system based on the
submission of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), wherein Parties de-
tail the contributions they are committing to making to address climate change.3 8
NDCs should reflect the Parties' highest possible ambition within the common
but differentiated responsibilities framework. That is, the Party must state what it
is willing to do to address climate change and why its commitment is fair and
ambitious. 39 With each subsequent round of NDC submissions, Parties must
adopt progressively ambitious goals.
In short, the Paris Agreement "abandons the static, annex-based approach to
differentiation in the [UNFCCC] and the Kyoto Protocol, in favor of a more
flexible, calibrated approach, which takes into account a country's circumstances
and capacities." 40 It represents a move away from the starkly bifurcated view of
the world that characterized international climate law for almost twenty years and
more directly acknowledges the social realities driving states' highly individual-
ized interests and decisions on when and why they are willing to cooperate and
take steps to respond to climate change.
The adoption and rapid coming into force of the Paris Agreement 4t was her-
alded as a positive move towards facilitating more effective global cooperation
on everything from mitigation to adaptation to climate finance, as well as more
36 Paris Agreement, supra note 33, at Art. 4.
37 Id.
38 Paris Agreement, UNFCCC, 'Adoption of the Paris Agreement', fccc/cp/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 21
(2015), Art. 2 (While the Paris Agreement does not designate a shared global emission-reduction goal it
does establish the overarching objective of 'Holding the increase in the global average temperature to
well below 2'C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C
above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of
climate change').
39 See Lima Callfor Climate Action, Dec. 1/CP.20 (Dec. 14, 2014), in COP Report No. 20, Adden-
dum, at 2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add. I (Feb. 2, 2015) (Countries have approached this task differ-
ently, with some keeping their statements narrow and concise, while others are using the NDCs process
as a platform for talking more broadly about national circumstances and addressing, with specificity,
what they believe fairness and ambition mean).
40 Bodansky, supra note 34, at 290.
41 Paris Agreement, supra note 33, at Art. 21 (The Paris Agreement was opened for signature on
April 22, 2016 at which time 175 Parties signed the Agreement. By October 5, 2016, the signatory
threshold was met, allowing the Paris Agreement to enter into force, which it did on November 4, 2016,
less than a year after it was adopted. Article 21 specifies that the Agreement will come into force "thirty
days after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an
estimated 55 % of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, approval or accession with the Depositary." At the time of writing, 183 of the 197
Parties to the Convention have ratified the Agreement).
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focused and diversified forms of mitigation experimentation at the state level.
Within this context, one of the primary reasons that the Paris Agreement was
viewed as a success was because all of the major greenhouse gas emitters became
parties to the Agreement and, consequently, submitted NDCs laying out their
mitigation goals and strategies. For the first time, key players such as the United
States, China, the EU, India, and Brazil were all working together under a frame-
work that called on each of the states to participate in efforts to mitigate climate
change, to facilitate adaptation, and to be transparent about their overarching
objectives in doing so. Accordingly, pursuant to the Paris Agreement, for the first
time, every party to the agreement - regardless of their economic development
status - commits to pursuing mitigation efforts, and to being explicit and trans-
parent about the steps they intend to take to do so and why the steps they are
taking are fair and ambitious.42As of late 2018, 179 (of 183) Parties had submit-
ted their first NDCs.
The ambitious climate-limiting goals embodied by the Paris Agreement and
the high levels of party participation reflect growing concerns about the negative
impacts of climate change and an increased willingness on the part of states
worldwide to work together towards a common solution. The participation of the
United States and China is particularly important, given that they are the two-
largest net global emitters of climate change pollutants and had previously been
at odds over their respective roles in contributing to, and alleviating climate
change. 43
Despite these forward-looking developments, when assessing the Paris Agree-
ment based on expected effectiveness to limit climate change, even if Parties
fully fulfilled the commitments they make in their NDCs, it is unlikely that this
would hold warming below 2°C, much less achieving the more ambitious 1.5°C
target.44 In fact, one estimate suggests that policies existing as of November 2016
would achieve warming of about 3.6°C, but that if Parties fulfilled all of the
commitments they have made under Paris this would "limit warming to about
42 Paris Agreement, supra note 33, at Art. 4. (In key part, however, Article 4 mandates different
forms of mitigation commitments from developed and developing country Parties, as such:
"Developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emis-
sion reduction targets. Developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and
are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the
light of different national circumstances.").
43 See The White House - President Barack Obama, U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on
Climate Change (Sept. 25, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/201 5 /O9 /2 5 /us-
china-joint-presidential-statement-climate-change (Notably, in the lead up to the Paris meeting, the
United States and China - the two largest net greenhouse gas emitters - issued a joint announcement
sharing their respective commitments and their renewed commitment to bilateral cooperation).
44 Global Warming of 1.5°C, supra note 1, at DI. (The recent IPCC report highlights the existing
mitigation gap:
"Estimates of the global emissions outcome of current nationally stated mitigation ambitions as
submitted under the Paris Agreement would lead to global greenhouse gas emissionsl8 in 2030
of 52-58 GtCO2eq yr-I (medium confidence). Pathways reflecting these ambitions would not
limit global warming to 1.5'C, even if supplemented by very challenging increases in the scale
and ambition of emissions reductions after 2030 (high confidence). Avoiding overshoot and reli-
ance on future large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) can only be achieved if
global C02 emissions start to decline well before 2030 (high confidence).").
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2.8°C above pre-industrial levels, or in probabilistic terms, likely limit warming
below 3.1 °C." Accordingly, while the Paris Agreement may push us farther along
toward the 2°C goal, there is still a significant mitigation ambition gap.
If, from a pure mitigation-effectiveness perspective, the Paris Agreement falls
short, even assuming full Party compliance, which is a naive assumption (partic-
ularly given the current US stance) 45, what then makes it historic and the tool to
prevent climate disaster? Perhaps it is because "[r]emarkably, all major protago-
nists endorsed the deal, and countries with diametrically opposed interests sup-
ported it"46 and, thus, it provides the momentum and the platform states need to
cooperate and move towards increasingly meaningful and ambitious change. Or,
perhaps it is because the Paris Agreement doubles down on the importance of
adaptation and places greater emphasis on loss and damage, climate finance, in-
clusive mitigation mechanisms, and other measures linked to efforts to promote
equity and fairness in climate actions. 47 All of these facets are important. Argua-
bly, however, the greatest success of the Paris Agreement is disrupting the previ-
ous paradigm of international climate law and offering a new governance model.
In key part, the Paris Agreement responds to the rigidity and deficiencies of
the previous approach and makes a sharp turn away from the existing top-down
mitigation framework while also inviting a more transparent and inclusive dis-
cussion of fairness and centering that discussion as the frame for international
cooperation. Disrupting the conventional top-down approach is no small accom-
plishment. This model emerged from and reflected a traditional form of multilat-
eral environmental agreement and inertia that kept the international community
rooted within this conventional form of cooperation even as its utility faltered in
the wake of the struggles, first to ratify, and later to implement and move beyond
the limited commitments embodied by the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement's
predecessor. In addition, the inclusivity of the Paris Agreement, particularly in its
reliance on NDCs, represents an important step forward for procedural justice.
As much as the free-form nature of the NDCs invites uncertainties and dispari-
ties, it also provides a platform for states to speak to their needs and to ground
their contributions in the context of their circumstances. Whereas a top-down
prescriptive consensus may be simpler and more efficient, it is also prone to
neglecting the most vulnerable, and to suppressing their voices. Even if the sub-
stantive goals of the Paris Agreement at first fall short, the states that have the
most to lose, and the least capacity to limit climate change now, at least, have a
platform to say so, and to play an active part in defining and giving contour to
what 'fairness' and 'ambition' mean.
45 On June 1, 2017, President Trump declared that the United States would "cease all implementation
of the nonbinding Paris Accord and the draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement imposes
on our country." The White House, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-ac
cord/ (While the United States is still formally a party to the Paris Agreements, its de facto withdrawal
from Agreement suggests that, at least in the short-term, the United States will not be taking any formal
steps at the federal level to fulfill the commitments set out in the NDC).
46 Radoslav S. Dimitrov, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors, 16:3
GLoBAI. ENVM. PoL. 1, 2 (2016).
47 For a richer discussion of this issue, see generally Carlarne & Colavecchio, supra note 14.
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Ultimately, the Paris Agreement does not offer a grand solution to climate
change. Its greatest success is disrupting the previous paradigm of international
climate law that we tried unsuccessfully to use for 20 plus years. That paradigm
was static and envisioned big solutions facilitated by high levels of consensus-
based state cooperation. That model made sense at the time it was crafted but,
ultimately, did not reflect the political or physical realities of climate change. The
Paris framework recognizes those deficiencies and provides room to rethink
modes of cooperation and diversified strategies for mitigation. It provides a more
realistic platform for progress. That is its greatest strength. But, the work of
translating the commitments made under the Paris Agreement into real and
meaningful actions is only just beginning. In addition, from a pure effectiveness
perspective, we remain far from our very basic goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system and keep humanity within a safe oper-
ating space.
As we stand at this precipice, recognizing the existential importance of limit-
ing climate change and possessing a new international legal agreement to use as
the basis for doing so, the next question we must ask is what are the most impor-
tant roadblocks to our efforts to develop a more effective and equitable system of.
international climate change law?
Part HI: The Roadblocks - Collective Action & the Myth of the
International Community
Here, of course, it would be easy to say political will. This is often the default
answer for most complex questions of international law and diplomacy. The an-
swer, of course, is much more complex than that because the presence or absence
of political will turns on any number of factors. With respect to climate change,
the ability to garner political will to support legal efforts to address climate
change is influenced by many different aspects of complexity whether it be scien-
tific, economic, social, or cultural. The nature of the political will challenge var-
ies across time and place, as so aptly demonstrated by the populist movements
and radical governance shifts that are presently shaping the contours of systems
of environmental law worldwide.48
At the international level - and with respect to international law - the collec-
tive action nature of climate change is what presents the most significant chal-
lenge. The notion of a collective action problem is a familiar one and, as
discussed, climate change is the quintessential international collective-action
48 For example, between August and October of 2018, President Trump took dramatic steps to
reshape US climate change law; the United Kingdom government warned of the far-reaching impacts of a
no-deal Brexit; the French environmental minister resigned in frustration over climate inaction; Australia
failed to pass legislation limiting greenhouse gas emissions; Brazil elected as their next president the
populist, Jair Bolsonaro, who campaigned on an aggressively anti-environmental platform. See, e.g., Dan
Farber, Another Scary Election (But Not Here), LEGAL PLANET (Oct. 22, 2018), http://legal-planet.org/
2018/10/22/another-scary-election-but-not-here/; but see, Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla & Louis J.
Kotze, Living in Harmony with Nature? A Critical Appraisal of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia, 7
TRANSNAT'L ENvTL. L. 397, 400 (2018) (discussing the ways in which countries such as Ecuador and
Bolivia are pushing for a more progressive re-imagining of environmental law).
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problem. Whether we characterize it as a wicked 49 or a massive problem, 50 scien-
tific and political consensus underscores that mitigating climate change demands
buy-in and active engagement on the part of all of the developed and emerging
economies, while adapting to climate change necessitates local, regional, and in-
ternational efforts on a scale that is almost impossible to conceive. 51 Responding
to both the causes and consequences of climate change, therefore, depends upon
high levels of state cooperation. As a result, international climate change law was
constructed around the premise of the necessity of cooperation, but also a belief
in the possibility of international cooperation.
It is not, however, just the collective action nature of climate change in isola-
tion that impedes progress. It is that this challenge is situated within a larger,
ongoing debate in international law about the degree to which we see ourselves
as a collective human community - that is, as an international community - that
is prepared to act as a collective species.
International climate change law represents the paradigmatic example of the
assumption that we are a collective human community and we are prepared to
cooperate as such, when in actuality we are really far from a functioning, collec-
tive international community. 52 The assumption that there is an international
community reflects larger trends in international law that shaped the emerging
field of international environmental law and, eventually, climate change law.
As a result, the substance of international climate change law, and a critical
challenge underpinning the development of international climate change law can
be explained by pointing more directly to how our efforts to address climate
change reflect a larger ongoing struggle to decide whether we are, in fact, one
collective species capable of functioning as, and on behalf of an international
community. This question has taken on even more resonance in recent years with
the rise of the populist and authoritarian movements in the US, Europe, and
worldwide.
The notion that we are an international community that can and, at times,
should function collectively is intertwined with the evolution of international law
as a system of law focusing on ways to allow states to co-exist peacefully to a
system that, at times, also seeks to facilitate active cooperation around issues of
common interest.
In the wake of World War II, international law primarily operated to facilitate
peaceful coexistence between sovereign states. The primary goal of international
49 See Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4:2
POLICY SCIENCFS 155. (1973).
50 See J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. Rv;v. 59, 72-80 (2010).
51 See Daniel A. Farber & Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Climate Change Law 11 (2018) (Put simply, if
every country reduces greenhouse gas emissions, it is possible to limit anthropogenic climate change.
Individual state interests undercut these efforts, however, because, bluntly speaking, emissions are asso-
ciated with economic activity and states are thus incentivized to continue emitting and to free-ride on the
emissions reduction efforts of other states).
52 See generally Cinnamon P. Carlame & Mohamed S. Helal, A Conversation about Climate Change
Law and the 'International Community', 9 CLIMATi. L. 1 (2018).
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law was not to resolve all differences between states, but to recognize those dif-
ferences and find some form of equilibrium that would enable states to coexist
peacefully. In this way, the focus of the evolving body of international law was
on establishing and maintaining a minimum of order between potentially antago-
nistic entities or, to put it more bluntly, to find ways to keep entities peacefully
apart - that is, to allow them to peacefully coexist.5
3
In the later part of the twentieth century, as patterns of globalization intensi-
fied, states began to identify areas where new forms of international coopera-
tion54 were needed-e.g., human rights, economic development, environmental
protection. Intensifying patterns of environmental degradation, for example, re-
vealed the extent to which emerging challenges such as biodiversity loss, marine
pollution, ozone depletion, and acid rain required new forms of transnational co-
operation. As the contours of these transnational challenges emerged, there was
an effort to frame new governance approaches to address these shared concerns.
Notably, as part of these new cooperative governance efforts, instead of being
asked to refrain from certain behaviors, states were often tasked with actively
undertake something - that is, with adopting positive obligations. 55 To cooperate
around these shared interests, states began to develop new institutions to actively
bring parties together to establish objectives and obligations, and to assign new
divisions of labor designed to help achieve the goals of the common enterprise.
The emergence and rapid development of the field of international environmental
law in the latter part of the twentieth century aptly demonstrates this trend.
56
These new cooperative efforts reflected a fundamental shift in the way that we
envisioned state-to-state relationships and required much more ambitious efforts
on the part of states both individually and collectively. As a result, these collec-
tive tasks have proven extremely difficult to accomplish, in part because, as re-
nowned international law scholar George Abi-Saab suggests, they envisage
systems of law that "influence society by regulating and channeling social
change. ' '57 In order to effect social change, there is a need not only for a shared
sense of community around the issue, but also a complex set of institutions to
facilitate cooperative action. This has proven difficult and, in the environmental
context, although we have made impressive progress towards developing an in-
53 See generally Wolfgang Friedmann, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stevens
and Sons et al. 1964).
54 See generally Georges Abi-Saab, Whither the International Community, 9 EJIL 248 (1998).
55 See, e.g., Mohamed S. Helal, The Crisis of World Order and the Constitutive Regime of the Inter-
national System, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019) (in contrast, in the wake of World War II,
international law primarily operated to facilitate peaceful coexistence between sovereign states. The pri-
mary goal of international law was not to resolve all differences between states, but to recognize those
differences and find some kind of equilibrium that would enable states to coexist peacefully. This largely
entailed sets of negative obligations, as opposed to positive obligations).
56 See generally Donald K. Anton, The "Thirty-Percent Solution" and the Future of International
Environmental Law, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 2, 212 (2013) (discussing the rapid growth of environ-
mental norms and instruments). For a detailed discussion of the post 1960's development of domestic
environmental law in the United States and other developed countries, see Sanford Gaines, Reimagining
Environmental Law for the 21st Century, 44 ENVIL. L. REp. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10188, 10192-97 (2014).
57 Abi-Saab, supra note 54, at 256.
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creasingly sophisticated set of normative instruments and complex complemen-
tary institutions, these institutions have rarely been able to facilitate the type of
cooperation and positive action and change that is needed to resolve many of the
most pressing international environmental challenges, including climate change.
International will and collective action continues to lag.
The challenges we face in the field of international climate change law epito-
mize the extent to which grounding governance regimes in optimistic views of
international cooperation can both give life to, but ultimately impede the opera-
tion of emerging legal regimes. Emerging in the 1990s, climate change law built
upon an increasingly sophisticated body of international environmental law that,
by then, had been grappling with the challenges inherent in motivating coopera-
tion on transboundary environmental issues for two decades across a variety of
bilateral, regional, and international environmental challenges. Between the
1970s and 1992, when the UNFCCC was adopted, for example:
It was estimated that 885 different international environmental legal instru-
ments (hard and soft) and 139 different major international environmental treaties
were in existence. In the years between 1972 and 1992 alone, it was said that
more than 50 multilateral treaties relating to the protection of the marine environ-
ment were concluded. In the years between 1970 and 2004, three hundred and
forty-eight multilateral treaties and one hundred and forty nine protocols were
concluded, an average of roughly 100 combined instruments every five years
until 2005.58
These governance instruments embodied a variety of regulatory approaches
and reflected an evolving set of environmental norms, all of which presumed the
necessity and possibility of extensive international cooperation. The first two de-
cades of experimentation in the field of international environmental law revealed
the extent and complexity of global environmental challenges, but also provided
models for cooperation on issues such as reducing ozone-depleting substances
and curbing trade in endangered species. Incremental success in limiting environ-
mental degradation suggested not only that cooperation was possible, but also
that there was an increasing level of awareness and shared concern around envi-
ronmental challenges and their implications for economic development and
human health and well-being.
Building on the momentum and progress achieved during the 1970s and the
1980s, in 1992, members of the international community came together in Rio de
Janeiro for the UN Earth Summit. The objective of the Rio Earth Summit was to
convince world leaders that "nothing less than a transformation of our attitudes
and behaviour" was necessary to "rethink economic development and find ways
to halt the destruction of irreplaceable natural resources and pollution of the
planet." 59 The Summit was ambitious in scope and intent, bringing together lead-
ers representing 172 different governments, including 108 heads of state, as well
as more than 2,400 NGOs and in excess of 17,000 civil society participants and
seeking to convince governments of the fundamental need "to redirect interna-
58 Anton, supra note 56, at 213-14.
59 United Nations - Earth Summit, UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992).
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tional and national plans and policies to ensure that all economic decisions fully
took into account any environmental impact." 60
The UN Earth Summit represented the culmination of two decades of efforts
to develop a collective conscious around transnational environmental challenges.
The Earth Summit was infused with a sense of determination and optimism
around facilitating international environmental cooperation. 6t The levels of par-
ticipation, breadth of focus, degree of cooperation, and extent of legal develop-
ment at the Earth Summit was unprecedented, and has never been repeated in
international environmental law. Summit participants grappled with some of the
most complex international challenges of our time, yet they approached the
growing set of environmental challenges with determination and with optimism.
This is the context in which international climate change law was born. The
UNFCCC was adopted at the UN Earth Summit. International climate change
law, thus, emerged at the pinnacle of cooperation and optimism about collective
efforts to take on international environmental challenges. This collective spirit
and aspirational optimism infuses the text of the UNFCCC and early cooperative
efforts to address climate change. This optimism was not nailve or ignorant to the
challenge at hand. State and non-state actors, alike, understood the scale of the
emerging challenge. Yet, even in the face of this challenge, there was a collective-
sense of cooperation and community. While this state of optimism gradually
eroded as negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol began and the massive nature of
the climate challenge began to take more granular form, the point of emergence
for international climate change law was one of collective spirit and an implicit
belief in the ability to foster a shared sense of international community, commit-
ment, and cooperative action around climate efforts.
The origins and early institutions of international climate change law, hence, is
grounded in the presumption that the international community is capable of coop-
erating to achieve meaningful progress on behalf of humankind, despite poten-
tially competing individual state interests. This early view of cooperation
informed the shape of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and infused the first
two decades of international climate change negotiations. 62 The sense of collec-
tive interest and commitment is the basis upon which the climate regime is built
6 Id.
61 'Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development; Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development; Statement of Forest Principles: The Final Text of Agreements Negotiated by Govern-
ments at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)', 3-14 June 1992,
Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. New York, NY: United Nations Dept. of Public Information (1993), at 2.1.
(See, for example, the 95 different references to 'international community' that occur in Agenda 21 and,
in particular, the language in Chapter 2:
"In order to meet the challenges of environment and development, States have decided to estab-
lish a new global partnership. This partnership commits all States to engage in a continuous and
constructive dialogue, inspired by the need to achieve a more efficient and equitable world econ-
omy, keeping in view the increasing interdependence of the community of nations and that sus-
tainable development should become a priority item on the agenda of the international
community. It is recognized that, for the success of this new partnership, it is important to over-
come confrontation and to foster a climate of genuine cooperation and solidarity. It is equally
important to strengthen national and international policies and multinational cooperation to adapt
to the new realities.")
62 See, e.g., Carlarne & Helal, supra note 52, at 240-42.
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and it has created an essential platform for establishing a fundamental set of
shared goals and norms. During the first two decades of operation, it prompted
parties to begin reducing their domestic emissions and created platforms for co-
operation on mitigation, adaptation, climate finance, and technology transfer.
This model, however, fell well short of mobilizing the extent of international
cooperation necessary to ensure the level of large-scale, long-term global reduc-
tions in greenhouse gases needed to curb climate change.
Ultimately, the prevailing model of law represented by the Kyoto Protocol,
premised on one shared emissions reduction goal, minimally differentiated and
maximally reliant on a collective sense of obligation, failed to mobilize the extent
of international cooperation necessary to limit the causes and consequences of
climate change. Recognizing the limits of this approach, in 2009, the parties to
the UNFCCC began to move towards a new model that responded more directly
to the highly individualized circumstances, objectives, and interests of individual
states. The resulting institution, the Paris Agreement, represents and inflection
point in international climate change law. In key part, as discussed, the Paris
Agreement offers the parameters for a new approach to climate change that is
premised on motivating more individualized forms of cooperation and mitigation.
This model embraces a pluralistic vision of international cooperation that is con-
ducive to facilitating state (and non-state) efforts to experiment and be more am-
bitious in their individual and collective efforts to address climate change. The
new model of cooperation and individualization that the Paris Agreement repre-
sents responds to the fundamental political reality that cooperation is seldom self-
less and that states are motivated by a variety of factors but, ultimately, by highly
individualized, as opposed to collective concerns.
As we find ourselves at a moment in time when populist and authoritarian
movements worldwide are putting increasing pressure on already fragile coopera-
tive international institutions, it is an opportune moment to ask whether, in fact,
there is an 'international community' or whether, even if the absence of this
mythical international community we can acknowledge the existence of the in-
contestably global, collective interests that bind us and require us to come to-
gether for a common goal, and for our common good.63 With respect to the
evolving body of international climate change law, the relevant question is
whether we have built up enough of a sense of awareness of the individualized
and collective risks of climate change, and enough of a normative and institu-
tional foundation around climate change to support efforts to cooperate with re-
spect to this profound challenge.
63 See Carlarne & Helal, supra note 52. (For a much more robust investigation of the ways in which
early efforts to address climate change presumed the existence of an international community that would
facilitate the level of cooperation needed to structure effective solutions to a massive and complex collec-
tive-action problem, and how reliance on this vision hampers efforts to think critically about how to
address the causes and consequences of climate change).
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Part IV: Abandoning Grand Optimism in Favor of Grim Determination
This essay does not attempt to construct a sense of grand optimism around past
or present international efforts to address climate change. In fact, it instead delib-
erately "sin[s] against the prime American idol, optimism"' 64 and encourages the
deconstruction of grand optimism and discourages over-emphasis on the search
for grand solutions. Instead, it hopes to motivate a sense of grim determination
and a willingness to fight for incremental progress at every level of governance.
Optimism allowed us to identify the challenge of climate change and to come
together to craft the foundations of international climate change law. Optimism
infused our belief in a cooperative international community. Ultimately, how-
ever, stubborn optimism and the belief in traditional solutions to a problem that
defies traditional responses has slowed us down. We had an idea that climate
change was susceptible to high-level, large-scale fixes and that law - law at the
international level and law at the state level - could be used as the essential
foundations for that fix. That has not proven to be the case.
Therefore, to the extent that we think optimism means that we can come to-
gether as an international community to find grand solutions to climate change
and that law will be the foundation upon which those grand solutions are built,
this essay seeks to chip away at that idealized vision. Instead, it argues for dis-
mantling a vision of international climate change law constructed on optimism
about the possibility of grand solutions to allow for a vision of international cli-
mate change law grounded in the inevitably incremental and fragmented hard
work of whittling away at the challenges climate change poses even when the
task before us is daunting and does not lend itself to easy solutions but, instead,
requires experimentation, vision, leadership and, ultimately, lots of fixes that add
up to something bigger.
Twenty plus years of experience in crafting a system of international climate
change law has demonstrated that fresh thinking and new approaches are needed.
This does not mean that we have not made progress at every level of governance.
In fact, as climate law has matured, a complex climate regime consisting of di-
verse and varied systems of governance has emerged. 65 Climate change law, in
fact, "has shown a remarkable degree of resilience in adapting to barriers."
66
There may never be a grand solution to climate change, but there are many op-
portunities for real and meaningful change, for change that matters in big and
small ways to humanity's ability to operate within a safe space.
However we choose to approach it, the stakes of responding to climate change
are high and getting higher and we are at a critical moment in determining our
collective future. Sweeping success is no longer a realistic goal, but gradual, hard
fought for, incremental successes are. As Farber reminds us: "[w]hat we do
know... is that success is possible despite the existence of serious obstacles.
64 John F. Ross, How the West Was Lost, THr ATLAnmc (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.
com/ideas/archive/2018/09/how-the-west-was-lost/569365/.
65 See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9
PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 7. (2011).
66 Farber & Carlarne, supra note 13, at 3.
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Whether success will be achieved is up to us; neither success nor failure is man-
dated by human nature or the logic of human institutions. '67
Despite existing mitigation gaps and deepening concerns around pervasive
risks and the equity issues surrounding the distribution of those risks, the Paris
Agreement represents a step forward towards creating a more effective interna-
tional framework for limiting climate change. It may not reflect the coalescence
of the international community, as such, but it does reflect a more intentional
effort to come together to work individually and cooperativelytowards achieving
a common goal for the common good. That type of cooperation suggests pro-
gress, persistence and, ultimately, the type of grim determination essential to cul-
tivating a safe and sustainable path forward for humanity.
67 Farber, supra note 2, at 875.
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